10 Popular

·       Thinking Errors

·       Mistakes

·       Fatal Errors

concerning

the Euro Government Bond Crisis

and

the Euro Currency Union

 

 

 

Error No. 1:

It is he task of financial markets to tame governments (psi: private sector involvement): private banks and investors should regulate with their bond-buying and selling decisions the level of interest rates and with this the level of public debt.

Financial markets can select private companies, of which only the fittest should survive. They can not select a state of which only one exists.

Public debt has to be 100% safe – otherwise nobody will buy the government bonds – or only with much higher interest rates. Without the guaranty of the Central Bank these higher interest rates will work as a self fulfilling prophecy: the interest burden becomes higher and the deficit and the risk of state-default increases. So the interest rates rise further.. This vicious cycle ends in a state-default. The process will be accelerated because banks have to bear huge losses of falling prices of the government bonds in their portfolio. The banking system is then in danger and a highly probable credit squeeze will threaten the economy additionally.

 

Error No. 2:

Public debt is not needed, is bad and should be diminished 

Public debt has usually the form of bonds. These bonds are owned by banks, insurance companies and other private investors. They are the backbone of the assets of the social insurance system. They are the promise of future income which is needed to pay the pensions of the people. This paper is valuable like gold or forest or real estate. To increase public debt also means to increase the wealth of the people. If you reduce the public debt (by cutting it or by raising taxes) usually people become poorer.

 

Error No. 3:

A debt-haircut or an insolvency of the state helps the country.

In the first moment, the government has less debt. But the value of the bonds held by the private sector (banks, insurance, private investors, companies) will be eliminated. In Argentina more than half of the population fell in poverty – and probably stays still there. Argentina was most of all helped by the depreciation of the currency which fuelled an economic recovery. The insolvency makes people poor; it deletes the capital of banks and companies and erodes their ability to pay taxes. That is why the public debt after a hair cut can increase more than it has been cut.

 

Error No. 4:

A debt ceiling will help.

A debt ceiling restricts the political possibilities to stimulate the economy in a recession. So a country can fall in a deep depression without hope for help from politics. Higher tax deficits and soaring social expenditures for unemployment will increase the public debt and blast the debt ceiling away – even - ore because the country is on a painful austerity trip.

 

Error No. 5:

Countries are to blame themselves for their high public debts and deficits.

This is not completely true. In a currency union the competition between the companies of different countries is harder than before because there is no more currency buffer. In the economic competition like in soccer competition there is always a loser. If a country has national disadvantages - for instance the social, climatic or bureaucratic environment - the companies will lose, unemployment will rise , tax payments to the government will decrease and the public debt will soar.

 

Error No. 6:

There is no simple solution to the European public debt problem.

A 100% guaranty of the European Central Bank (ECB) for all Euro-public debt would solve the problem immediately. Euro-Government Bonds would be 100% save and an appealing store of purchasing power for all investors worldwide. Interest rates for all Euro-countries would be low and bonds of all Euro-governments would have top quality and top ratings. If the markets believe in the ECB-Guaranty, the ECB needs not to buy these bonds.

The problem with this solution is the mistrust, fear and the will to power of politicians who believe they could do better – and the here described thinking errors.

 

Error No. 7:

The government bond -buying of the ECB will lead to inflation.

This is only true if the demand for goods is so high that the goods run short. Europe is far from this point. In contrary the high unemployment indicates spare capacity. High inflation rates occur most of all after wars, when production facilities are destroyed. In a crisis there is a very long way from central bank money to inflation: low credit multipliers, sinking velocity of money, low utilisation of capacity.

 

Error No. 8:

A common Europe has a future only with a currency union.

Europe grew together in 50 years without a currency union but with a highly intelligent currency mechanism that helped the loser-countries and mitigated the competition.

In a politically “united” currency union with one fiscal policy very different political opinions of the countries will collide about how much debt for which project should be taken.

Below surface feelings like fear, mistrust, resentments and envy will lead the discussion. A “common” financial policy will threaten to divide Europe.

 

Error No. 9:

It is impossible to leave the currency union because of escalating government debt due to the devaluation of the new currency.

Leaving the Euro zone is possible with a temporary parallel currency (e.g. New Drachma). This New Drachma is fixed to the Euro for some time and all transactions can be paid in Euro and New Drachma. New Drachma bonds will be 100% guaranteed by the Greek Central Bank and will have a higher interest rate. With the new (emergency-) money the government has immediately avoided bankruptcy and can pay wages and stimulus programs.

The ECB is also buying New Drachma bonds to help to fund Greece the old Eurobonds. When the New Drachma devalues then Greece gets competitive advantages. Only the ECB suffers losses of its New Drachma Bonds. This is the least painful way of (leaving) the currency union.

 

Error No. 10:

An Emergency Fund (EFSF, ESM) is able to get enough money from investors to stabilize the government debt market.

The credit rating of an emergency fund depends on the credit rating of its members. If Germany is liable for the debt of other countries, its credit rating deteriorates. Due to this the credit rating of the fund deteriorates too and the fund must pay higher interest rates. The rising interest rates degrade the debt situation of all countries. In this vicious circle finally the emergency fund does not get money any more (except from the ECB – see error no. 6).

 

Read also: The Solution of the Euro-Crisis

 

 

EvoPro Financial Research GmbH 

January 2012